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Every year, more people are killed defending the environment than are soldiers from the 
UK and Australia, combined, on overseas deployments in war zones. During the last 
fifteen years, the number of both deaths of environmental defenders, and the countries 
where they occur, has increased: recorded deaths have increased from two per week to 
four per week over this period. The reasons for these deaths are primarily related to 
conflict over natural resources, across a range of sectors but in particular mining and 
agribusiness: > 230 deaths, of a total of 683, between 2014 and 2017. We find that, 
importantly, rule of law and corruption indices are most closely linked to patterns of 
killings. Using spatial data, we investigate the drivers of these conflicts and violence, seek 
to identify who may be most at risk, and why, and argue that businesses, investors, and 
national governments at both ends of the chain of violence need to be more accountable.   
 
Main 
Between 2002 and 2017, 1558 people in 50 countries were killed for defending their 
environments and lands1 (Supplementary Table 1), more than double the number of UK and 
Australian armed service people killed on active duty, in war zones over the same period 
(n=697;2,3), and almost half as many as the number of US soldiers killed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2001 (n=4044 4). ‘Environmental defenders’ here refers to people engaged 
in protecting land, forests, water and other natural resources. This includes community 
activists, members of social movements, lawyers, journalists, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) staff, park rangers, Indigenous peoples, members of traditional, peasant and agrarian 
communities, and those who resist forced eviction or other violent interventions. These people 
take peaceful action, either voluntarily or professionally, to protect the environment or land 
rights1. They may be directly involved in working on the land, or represent those who do, or 
be advocates for conservation of habitats or species. 
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The forms of violence (direct, structural, cultural) and the typologies of the harm caused (e.g. 
physical, psychological) are examined in detail elsewhere5-7. Here, we distinguish between 
larger-scale violence linked to armed conflicts (civil, guerrilla or inter-nation) rooted in 
struggles over natural resources, and that aimed at individuals or particular communities or 
groups of individuals due to their acts of resistance and/or protection of their land or 
environmental rights. Environmental defenders currently face a wave of violence, which also 
includes threats of physical harm, intimidation, and criminalisation8,9 (Figure 1). Here we focus 
on the killings of environmental defenders, which have been documented since 2002 through 
the work of Global Witness, UK, the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land Commission), 
Brazil, the Guardian, UK, and others. Deaths represent the ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’ of the violence 
that environmental defenders currently face: for every defender murdered, thousands more face 
direct violence, threats and psychological intimidation, and more invisible cultural and 
structural violence, or ‘slow violence’10. This violence is driven by natural resource 
exploitation, and we here examine the particular conditions, sectors and interactions leading to 
deaths of defenders. Using global datasets, we analyse the drivers of violence contributing to 
killings of environmental defenders. While other studies have looked at the links between 
authoritarianism and killings of environmental defenders11, and the relationship between 
economic growth and these deaths12, we further this analysis by evaluating the relationship 
between spatial factors (i.e. natural resource distribution, e.g. hectares of agricultural 
cultivation, area of mining concessions) and killings, and how we may begin to address the 
situation at a global level. 
 
Natural resource conflicts 
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Conflicts over natural resources are linked to different resources and/or sectors (e.g. fossil 
fuels, minerals, timber, agriculture, aquaculture, water), and access to land and/or bodies of 
water from which natural resources can be extracted13. These conflicts can be seen as the 
continuation of colonial land and resource appropriation that established systems of 
dispossession and control – including displacement, forced labour and denial of native and 
Indigenous rights; private control and exploitation of land and natural resources with state 
backing (e.g. the Congo Free State under King Leopold II of Belgium); benefits of natural 
resource exploitation in one nation accruing to another nation; and a global shift from 
communal to private land rights14. Developed countries’ resource consumption is outsourced 
to less wealthy nations and regions15.  
 
As such, conflicts often arise around the extraction of resources by companies or others without 
legitimate user rights to the resource (e.g. illegal logging in community forests), or when user 
rights are granted by corrupt governments (e.g. access to water already used by communities), 
or through political processes that fail to respect Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) (e.g. oil 
drilling in concessions in Indigenous territories in Peru16,17). In other cases of conflict, 
traditional natural resource users are excluded from the land, often in the name of conservation 
in national parks, or marine protected areas that restrict fishing activities (e.g. evictions of 
Indigenous Sengwer from their traditional forest lands, Kenya18,19). Some conflicts surround 
benefit-sharing from extractive industries (e.g. Panguna mine owned by Rio Tinto subsidiary 
BCL in Papua New Guinea20), while in others, it is the indirect effects of the extraction that 
lead to conflicts (e.g. water pollution caused by mining or oil drilling, air pollution from 
factories). In some more extreme cases, extractive industries can lead to displacement of 
communities either through contamination of rivers and lands that makes an area uninhabitable 
(e.g. Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador and Peru; 21,22), or by flooding of entire communities for 
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the creation of hydroelectric dams (e.g. the Belo Monte dam, Pará, Brazil; the Lower Sesan II 
dam, Strung Treng, Cambodia; 23,24). In addition to local or national industrial drivers based on 
these natural resources, multinational corporations that directly outsource their resource 
exploitation can play a significant role in violence against environmental defenders21.  
 
In many cases, environmental conflicts do not lead to physical violence. However, in cases 
with intractable conflict, which cannot be solved through various social, administrative or legal 
processes25, violence can emerge. Three conditions increase the chances of violence against 
defenders: i) strong incentives (financial, political, other) by government and private actors to 
exploit natural resources; ii) marginalisation (economically, culturally, politically) of those 
who depend most on natural resources and; iii) weak rule of law (corruption, lack of 
enforcement, impunity)1,8,9.  Using global datasets on variables related to deforestation rate, 
corruption indices, allocation of land concessions, agri-business commodity prices and other 
potential drivers, we explored spatial relationships between governance, natural resource 
sectors, and deaths, to identify key interactions.  
 
Drivers of environmental defender deaths 
In 2017, at least 185 environmental and land defenders were killed1, and of these, Indigenous 
peoples died in higher numbers than any other group (approximately 40% of deaths in 2015 
and 2016, and 30% of deaths in 2017). Regionally, most of these deaths were in Central 
America (36%), followed by South America (32%), and Asia (31%); the Philippines and 
Colombia had the greatest number of Indigenous deaths overall (36 and 22, respectively) 
during 2015-2017.  
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The availability of data on murders of environmental defenders is limited by research effort 
(contacts, languages spoken), the extent of free media, and presence of human rights monitors 
in some countries. Countries with the lowest protection for press and NGOs have the highest 
corruption scores26. The data are likely to be underestimates, and countries that appear to have 
the highest number of killings may in fact be those with a free press; apparent increases in 
numbers of murders may be due to improvements in reporting.  
 
The key natural resource sector drivers of violence and deaths vary by country or region (Figure 
2). For the period 2014-2017, the most deaths linked to the agriculture sector were in the 
Philippines and Brazil (Figure 3a); Brazil is also the country with the most deaths in the logging 
sector (Figure 3b). For mining and extraction, the most deaths were in the Philippines, 
Colombia and India (Figure 3c), while Guatemala and Honduras had the most deaths related to 
water and dams (Figure 3d). Poaching-related deaths were most frequent in Vietnam and the 
DRC. Although there is some correlation between the spatial distribution of natural resource 
extent and exploitation, and number of deaths of environmental defenders locally, there is no 
global universal pattern between spatial extents of resource sectors.  
 
Using all deaths data, for 2002-2017, Kendall’s tau analyses revealed significant correlations 
between deaths per million and rule of law (p=6.396e-07; τ=0.34), and deaths per million and 
area harvested (p=0.00163; τ=0.22): these two drivers are themselves closely correlated 
(p=0.00062; τ=0.21), although we note that correlation does not equate to causation. There was 
some correlation between deaths per capita and dams (p=0.04223; τ=0.20), but none between 
deaths per million and mining or intact forest (p=0.2197; τ=0.17 and p=0.4014; τ=0.01, 
respectively). Welch t-test analysis of binary deaths and rule of law showed significant 
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difference between the two groups (p=2.057e-09; t=6.47), and for rule of law and area 
harvested (p=0.0297; t=-2.24).  
 
A country’s rule of law was the key variable associated with environmental deaths (Figure 4a 
and 4b). While there was a strong correlation (P<0.0001) between the countries with the most 
deaths and their rule of law score, (27 accessed 15/10/2018), it may be also the case that the 
most corrupt countries are so dangerous and have such weak rule of law that there is less 
environmental activism, e.g., Somalia, North Korea and Afghanistan. There was a clear 
positive correlation between economic development and safety28, but even countries that are 
not deemed very corrupt can see brutal crimes against environmental defenders (e.g., 
Ireland).  All except three (n=47) of the countries where deaths have been recorded are classed 
as highly corrupt, in that their Corruption Perceptions Index score fell below 50 on a 0-100 
scale26.  
 
Discussion 
Weak rule of law is identified as an important condition leading to violence against defenders. 
The level of impunity in the killings of environmental defenders is high: globally on average it 
is estimated that just over 10% of these murders result in a conviction 29, which is low compared 
to global homicide convictions, which was 43% on average in 201230. Impunity in these cases 
of violence against environmental defenders is linked to two main factors. Firstly, corruption 
within police and judiciary branches in many countries means that cases are not properly 
investigated or tried, and indeed sometimes it is the police and/or government authorities who 
are directly responsible for the violence, or have financial and or familial ties to those 
responsible. The massacre of ten land activists at Pau D’Arco, Pará, Brazil, 24th May 2017, is 
one instance where civil police are the main suspects 31. Secondly, because they are linked to 
8 
 
natural resources, many murders occur in remote areas with weak government and police 
presence, which adds to the difficulty of gathering evidence.  In Brazil, consistently the country 
with the highest number of killings of environmental defenders, especially Indigenous peoples, 
the election of Jair Bolsonaro raises new concerns as he promises to relax gun laws and 
environmental protections while labelling NGOs and activists as terrorists32, in order to 
undermine and repress those in disagreement with the political regime11. In the Philippines 
there was a 71% increase in the number of murders of environmental defenders from 2016 to 
2017 under Rodrigo Duterte, who has taken a violent stance toward human rights defenders, 
Indigenous peoples, environmentalists, women, drug users, and others. 
 
Indigenous peoples manage or have tenure rights over at least ~38 million km2 globally, about 
a quarter of the world’s land surface, which overlaps with about 40% of all terrestrial protected 
areas and ecologically intact landscapes33. Additionally, conflict over natural resources and 
land often arises due to failure to recognize Indigenous land rights, or poor law enforcement to 
protect those rights. Although evidence is increasing that Indigenous Territories are equally, or 
more, effective at conserving forests than state managed protected areas34, continuing lack of 
rights, repression and marginalisation, and liberalization of external investment in land-based 
sectors means that these groups are more subject to high levels of violence with impunity11. 
Indigenous rights infringements and resulting violent conflict is also apparent in the global 
North: in the United States, the Standing Rock resistance to the North Dakota Access Pipe Line 
was forcefully repressed with use of water cannon in sub-zero temperatures; many 
demonstrators were hospitalized.  
 
The cause of deaths is primarily conflict over resources as local communities and defenders 
are not consulted, and instead often violently silenced. It should be noted that although no 
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deaths have yet been recorded in the US or the UK we see environmental rights there being 
eroded, and environmental defenders increasingly being deemed criminals. For instance, in 
September 2018 in the UK, historic jail sentences were handed down to three anti-fracking 
protestors in the UK, convicted of causing a public nuisance following their non-violent direct 
action to prevent hydraulic fracking at Preston New Road, Lancashire; the first environmental 
activists to receive jail sentences for a protest in the UK since 1932 (for land trespass)35. This 
situation gives rise to grave concerns around the impacts on sustainable development and UK 
(in)action on meeting the country’s climate change commitments.  
 
Local or national variables contributing to environmental conflict include corruption and land 
tenure allocations. International and multinational companies that profit from natural resources 
sourced under conditions that infringe defenders’ rights in one country and sold elsewhere are 
complicit in driving violence through their supply chains, and have a responsibility to act 
transparently and ethically. There is a clear need for a global perspective on natural resource 
conflicts, recognising transboundary impacts, and teleconnections. The current displacement 
of environmental and social damage, from countries in the global North to countries in the 
global South, is a result of globalisation, and longer historical trends such as colonialism, and 
is increasing as trade and consumption grow36. The correlation between rule of law and area 
harvested in our analysis reflects this relationship. This global perspective needs to be further 
explored in both academia and the non-academic world: transparency across all aspects of 
environmental conflict is necessary37.  
 
Conclusion 
People are dying to protect their livelihoods, and the forests, lands and ecosystems that provide 
for our future. These killings are on the scale of armed conflict – defined as 25 killings per 
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year38: 56 environmental defenders were killed in Brazil and 47 people in the Philippines in 
2017. This study offers a novel global analysis of the drivers of violence, showing that 
corruption and rule of law are significant predictors of environmental defender deaths. To 
address this situation, governments, businesses and investors need to be held accountable for 
their role in supply chains that drive violence. 
 
The voices and actions of those at the frontline of environmental protection are violently 
suppressed by powerful actors: the hard end of a continuum of inequality11. The silencing of 
voices proximate to the frontline is of global concern: if people are afraid to speak up or 
campaign, this could lead to the silencing of important environmental issues even in 
theoretically safe countries; it undermines international conventions, such as the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, and efforts to meet the Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
The natural resource sectors shown to play a role as underlying drivers are implicated in these 
murders. All companies should be accountable for the impact their business practices have, and 
one way of addressing the issue could be through international schemes and legislation for 
environmental protection, to which all companies would be required to be signatories. In 
addition to threats against people, global trade puts biodiversity at risk39. Use of new laws such 
as the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act40, set up as an anti-money 
laundering mechanism and as a way of penalising perpetrators of human rights abuses, offer 
new routes to accountability, and to protecting environmental defenders. This type of provision 
could be a model for international legislation on environmental harm to create accountability 
for industries targeting natural resources in conditions of weak local rule of law – conditions 
that result in deaths of defenders. Companies and consumers must investigate the sources of 
their products, publish the results and commit to eliminating violence from their supply chains.  
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Methods 
The natural resource sector drivers of conflict are categorised as ‘agribusiness’, ‘logging’, 
‘mining and extraction’, ‘poaching’ (often combined with ‘fishing’), ‘water and dams’, and 
‘other’, by Global Witness1. We extracted spatial data on each of these four natural resource 
sectors from freely available online resources, using relevant indicators: area harvested, intact 
forest, mining concessions, and major dams. Data on environmental defender deaths were 
provided by Global Witness. We calculated rates of death per million population for each of 
the 50 countries where killings had taken place. For Indigenous groups, we extracted death 
data for available years, 2015-2017, and calculated: proportions of total killings, by country, 
and by region (Supplementary Table 2).  
 
We investigated the link between environmental defender deaths and corruption using rule of 
law, based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open 
government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and 
criminal justice27. The data were partial in some cases, for example, rule of law indices and 
dam numbers were not available for all countries, including for Honduras and Guatemala, even 
though that sector was recorded as the key driver of deaths in those countries, and so we 
included in our analyses all countries with data available for two or more of the five potential 
drivers. We used Kendall’s tau analysis to identify significant correlations, and Welch’s t-test 
to identify significant differences between grouped data. For absolute deaths and rule of law 
(i.e. using only data from the 50 countries where deaths had occurred), we used a GLM.  
 
Data availability 
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The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 
upon request, and were sourced from the following organisations.  
For environmental defender deaths: https://www.globalwitness.org; 
for area harvested (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC);  
for intact forest (http://www.intactforests.org/data.ifl.html);  
for mining concessions 
(https://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/26a457ee3b584824bb930f2ec791b60d_0);  
for major dams 
(http://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/537361e2df59486e898cd4e024af57ea_0);  
for Rule of Law index: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index 
 
 
 
Please address correspondence and requests for materials to n.butt@uq.edu.au 
The authors have no competing interests. 
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Billy Kyte, Ben Leather, and others at Global Witness 
for data provision and earlier discussion, and Hawthorne Beyer and Alienor Chauvenet for 
advice and help with data analysis. Thanks to the many environmental defenders we have 
worked with, interviewed and learned from. N. Butt is supported by Australian Research Council 
Discovery Early Career Award DE150101552. 
 
 
Author contributions 
NB, FL, MM planned the work, AR and NB analysed the data, all authors contributed to the 
writing. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
References 
1 Global Witness. At What Cost?  (Global Witness, 2018). 
2 UK Government. Summary statistics on deaths among the UK regular armed forces. (2018). 
3 Australian Government. Deaths as a result of service with Australian units. (2018). 
4 DeBruyne, N. F. American war and military operations casualties: lists and statistics. 
Congressional Research Service (2107). 
5 Galtung, J. Violence, peace and peace research. Journal of Peace Research 6, 167-191 (1969). 
6 Peluso, N. L. & Watts, M. Violent Environments.  (Cornell University Press, 2001). 
7 Le Billon, P. Wars of plunder: Conflicts, profits and the politics of resources.  (Columbia 
University Press, 2012). 
8 Knox, J. H. Environmental Rights Defenders, A Global Crisis. Universal Rights Group Policy 
Brief. (2107). 
9 Ghazoul, J. & Kleinschroth, F. A global perspective is needed to protect environmental 
defenders. Nature Ecology and Evolution 2 (2008). 
10 Nixon, R. Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor.  (Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
11 Middeldorp, N. & Le Billon, P. Deadly Environmental Governance: Authoritarianism, Eco-
populism, and the Repression of Environmental and Land Defenders. Ann Am Assoc Geogr 
109, 324-337, doi:10.1080/24694452.2018.1530586 (2019). 
12 Jeffords, C. & Thompson, A. An empirical analysis of fatal crimes against environmental and 
land activists. Economics Bulletin 36, 827-842 (2016). 
13 Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. & Stern, P. C. The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302, 1907-
1912 (2003). 
14 Lynch, M. J., Stretesky, P. B. & Long, M. A. Green criminology and native peoples: the 
treadmill of production and the killing of indigenous environmental activists. Theoretical 
Criminology 22, 318-314, doi:doi/abs/10.1177/1362480618790982 (2018). 
15 Wiedmann, T. O. et al. The material footprint of nations. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 112, 6271-
6276, doi:10.1073/pnas.1220362110 (2015). 
16 Finer, M., Jenkins, C. N., Pimm, S. L., Keane, B. & Ross, C. Oil and gas projects in the Western 
Amazon: Threats to wilderness, biodiversity and indigenous people. PLoS One 3, e2932, 
doi:doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0002932 (2008). 
17 Butt, N., Beyer, H. & Possingham, H. P. Globally important biodiversity under immediate 
threat in Yasuni National Park, Ecuador. Science 342 (2016). 
18 Barletti, J. P. S. & Larson, A. M. Rights abuse allegations in the context of REDD+ readiness 
and implementation A preliminary review and proposal for moving forward. . (CIFOR, 2107). 
19 Alden Wily, L. Risks to the sanctity of community lands in Kenya. A critical assessment of 
new legislation with reference to forestlands. Land Use Policy 75, 661-672, 
doi:doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.02.006 (2018). 
20 Regan, A. J. Bougainville: Large-scale mining and risks of conflict recurrence. Security 
Challenges 10, 71-96 (2014). 
21 Wijesinghe, P. Environmental Pollution and Human Rights Violations by Multinational 
Corporations. SSRN (2018). <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164142>. 
22 Yusta-García, R., Orta-Martínez, M., González-Crespo, C. & Rosell-Melé , A. Water 
contamination from oil extraction activities in Northern Peruvian Amazon rivers. 
Environmental Pollution 225, 370-380 (2017). 
23 Bratman, E. Z. Contradictions of Green Development: Human Rights and Environmental 
Norms in Light of Belo Monte Dam Activism. Journal of Latin American Studies 2, 261-289, 
doi:doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X14000042 (2014). 
24 Baird, I. G. Non-government Organizations, Villagers, Political Culture and the Lower Sesan 
2 Dam in Northeastern Cambodia. Critical Asian Studies 2, 257-277, 
doi:doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2016.1157958 (2016). 
25 Burgess, H. & Burgess, G. Intractability and the Frontier of the Field. Confl Resolut Q 24, 177-
186, doi:10.1002/crq.166 (2006). 
14 
 
26 Transparency International.  Corruptions Perceptions Index (2018).  
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
27 World Justice Project.  WJP Rule of Law Index.  (2018). https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-
work/wjp-rule-law-index 
28 Jeffords, C. & Thompson, A. An empirical analysis of fatal crimes against environmental and 
land activists. Economics Bulletin 36, 827-842 (2016). 
29 Global Witness. Deadly Environment (Global Witness, 2014). 
30 UNODC. Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data. (United Nations, Vienna, 
2013). 
31 Center, B. a. H. R. R. Brazil: Pau D’Arco is the Second Largest Slaughter for Land Conflicts 
for 20 years. (Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 2017). 
32 Menton, M. & Milanez, F. Now the real fight begins. New Scientist (2018). 
33 Garnett, S. T. A spatial overview of the global importance of Indigenous lands for conservation. 
Nature Sustainability 1, 369-374 (2018). 
34 Schleicher, J., Peres, C. A., Amano, T., Llactayo, W. & Leader-Williams, N. Conservation 
performance of different conservation governance regimes in the Peruvian Amazon. Scientific 
Reports 7, 11318 (2017). 
35 Perraudin, F. Blackpool activists jailed for anti-fracking protest. The Guardian (2018). 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/26/anti-fracking-activists-jailed-for-
blackpool-cuadrilla-protest 
36 Wiedmann, T. & Lenzen, M. Environmental and social footprints of international trade. Nat 
Geosci 11, 314-321, doi:10.1038/s41561-018-0113-9 (2018). 
37 Temper, L., del Bene, D. & Martinez-Alier, J. Mapping the front lines of global environmental 
justice: the EJAtlas. Journal of Political Ecology 22, 255-278 (2015). 
38 Adger, W. N. et al. Human security. 755-791 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Cambridge, UK., New York, USA., 2014). 
39 Lenzen, M. et al. International trade drives biodiversity threats in developing nations. Nature 
486, 109-112, doi:10.1038/nature11145 (2012). 
40 Limon, M. & Carey, M. G.    (ed Universal Rights Group) (Universal Rights Group, Geneva, 
2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Figure legends 
Figure 1: Typology of violence. Violence can be manifest in different forms all of which can be linked 
to violence against environmental defenders who often include Indigenous peoples / ethnic minorities 
(cultural violence) and economically marginalised groups (structural violence). Herein, we focus on 
direct physical violence which leads to death which is the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the violence experienced 
by environmental defenders.  
 
Figure 2: For 2014-2017, spatial distribution of deaths by prominent key natural resource sectors: (a) 
agribusiness, logging, mining and extractive industries, water and dams, and poaching; (b) global total 
number of deaths by key natural resource sector; (c) total number of deaths between 2002 and 2017.  
 
Figure 3: Global overlay of environmental defender deaths 2014-2017 and natural resources drivers: 
a) agriculture (as area harvested). The most deaths in this sector were in the Philippines (n=39); b) 
logging/land clearance (as intact forest). The most deaths in this sector were in Brazil (n=41); c) 
mining/extraction. The most deaths in this sector were in Colombia (n=25) (as reserves/concessions); 
d) water and dams (major dams shown). The most deaths in this sector were in Guatemala (n=12) and 
Honduras (n=12). See Methods for data sources. 
 
Figure 4: Rule of Law overall score. This incorporates data from eight categories: absences of 
corruption, civil justice, criminal justice, fundamental rights, government powers, open government, 
order and security, regulatory enforcement. a) Countries in the darker colours have a higher index, and 
are more likely to be peaceful, safe and equitable, whereas countries in the lighter colours have a lower 
index and are less likely to be peaceful, safe and equitable. The map shows that there are more deaths 
in lighter-coloured countries, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions. b) A fitted GLM clearly 
indicates the correlation between numbers of deaths and Rule of Law. (Source: World Justice Project). 
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